INTRODUCTION
A total loss of all heat sinks occurs following a failure of the primary heat transport pumps, the main feed-water pumps, the auxiliary feed-water pump, the main moderating cooling pump, and so on for Wolsong-1 NPP. Under this accident scenario, the pressurization of the primary heat transport system (PHTS) can be a threatening risk for the integrity of the primary pressure boundary.
In an accident of this type, the steam generators (SG) with the main steam safety valves (MSSV) are the first heat sink available to evacuate the fuel decay power without operator intervention. This heat sink will remain efficient for as long as the SG inventory is available. When the SG inventory is depleted, the heat exchange between the primary and the secondary side will degrade, causing the primary heat transport system (PHTS) to heat up. Swelling of the PHTS will increase its pressure. The PHTS liquid relief valves (LRV) and the degasser/condenser relief valves (DCRV) will become the sole means available to relieve the PHTS overpressure.
The DCRV 3332-RV11 and 3332-RV21 provide protection against overpressure to the degasser/condenser (DC) tank, which is connected, to the PHTS via the liquid relief valves (LRV). The two DCRVs (3332-RV11 and RV21) are spring loaded safety relief valves mounted parallel on the DC tank. Via a long pipe, this discharge goes directly to the floor of the reactor's south vault.
To protect the primary heat transport system during a total loss of heat sinks accident, a sufficient depressurization capability of the DCRV and the SG tube integrity by high temperature steam and differential pressure of steam generator's tube wall are very important. The analysis described here is to determine if the pressure tubes will fail prior to a containment bypass due to failure of the SG tubes. The SG tube integrity is determined by the high temperature steam or the differential pressure between the PHT pressure and the SG secondary side pressure.
We conducted our analysis of a total loss of all heat sinks accident using CATHENA. This is a two-fluid thermal hydraulic computer code developed by AECL for analysis of flow transients in reactors and piping networks. This code has been used for a wide range of thermal hydraulic applications. This paper describes the analysis of the degasser /condenser relief valve discharge capacity and the steam generator tube integrity under a total loss of all heat sinks using the CATHENA code [1] .
A total loss of all heat sinks is considered a severe accident with a low probability of occurrence. Following a total loss of all heat sinks, the degasser/condenser relief valves (DCRV) become the sole means available for the depressurization of the primary heat transport system. If a nuclear power plant has a total loss of heat sinks accident, high-temperature steam and differential pressure between the primary heat transport system (PHTS) and the steam generator (SG) secondary side can cause a SG tube creep rupture. To protect the PHTS during a total loss of all heat sinks accident, a sufficient depressurization capability of the degasser/condenser relief valve and the SG tube integrity is very important. Therefore, an accurate estimation of the discharge through these valves is necessary to assess the impact of the PHTS overprotection and the SG tube integrity of the primary circuit. This paper describes the analysis of DCRV discharge capacity and the SG tube integrity under a total loss of all heat sink using the CATHENA code. It was found that the DCRV's discharge capacity is enough to protect the overpressure in the PHTS, and the SG tube integrity is maintained in a total loss of all heat accident. KEYWORDS 
OVERVIEW OF THE DEGASSER CONDENSER RELIEF VALVES
The main heat transport system, which carries the heat generated in the reactor core to the steam generators, is a pressurized heavy water closed loop. The heat transport pressure and inventory control system is designed to provide a means of pressure and inventory for this closed loop as well as to provide adequate overpressure protection [2] . The 3332-RV11 and 3332-RV21 provide protection against overpressure to the DC tank, which is connected to the PHTS via the LRV 3332-PV 2/3/12/13 as shown in Figure 1 . The two DCRVs are spring loaded safety relief valves mounted parallel on the DC tank. Via a long pipe, this discharge goes directly to the floor of the reactor's south vault. The relief valves are proportional lift valves equipped with a vibration damper. They "pop" open to approximately 50% of their full capacity when the pressure in the D/C exceeds the set point. If the pressure keeps rising, the DCRV stem lifts to its maximum opening position. If the pressure falls, the steam remains at its position until the pressure is outside the hysteresis band. The valve will then start to close and follows the pressure drop. This design protects the valve from chattering. The valve certified liquid relief capacity is 26.67 kg/s at 110% of the set pressure and 268 ºC.
Each relief valve acts as a restriction and the liquid traveling through it experiences a pressure decrease and an increase in its velocity to maintain a steady flow. The lowest pressure will occur just downstream of the valve port at a point. Further downstream of this point, as the fluid stream expands into a large area, the velocity decreases and the pressure increases. However, the downstream pressure never recovers completely to equal the pressure that existed upstream of the valve [3] 
CATHENA CODE MODELING AND SG TUBE
INTEGRITY CRITERIA
Code Modeling
The Wolsong Nuclear Power Plant Unit 1 (WSNPP-1) is a CANDU-6 Pressurized Heavy Water Reactor (PHWR). It has 380 horizontal fuel channels surrounded by a cool low-pressure heavy water moderator. Each fuel channel is six meters long and contains twelve fuel bundles within a pressure tube. One bundle consists of 37 elements that contain natural uranium in the form of compacted sintered cylindrical pellets of uranium dioxide (UO2). The coolant enters the channel from an inlet feeder pipe that is connected to the inlet end fitting. Then, the coolant enters the fuel string, flowing within the channels between the fuel elements inside the pressure tube. The coolant leaves the channel via an outlet feeder pipe that is attached to the outlet end fitting. The coolant enters the channel at approximately 11 MPa and 263 ºC.
The core is subdivided into two symmetrically located figures in two loops. Each loop consists of two core passes of 95 channels each. The core has 380 fuel channels arranged in 22 rows and 22 columns. In the CATHENA model, the channel groupings are based on channel power and elevation. In each core pass, channel groups 1 to 4 contain high power channels from the inner region of the core; groups 5 to 7 contain lower power channels from the periphery of the core. As shown in Table 1 , the core configuration is composed of 380 channels, and divided into two core paths. Each core path has 180 channels and is simulated as 7 groups of channel height and channel power. The CATHENA model includes a detailed representation of the PHTS and the pressure and inventory control network with DCRV [5].
Pressure Tube Failure Model
The pressure tube circumference is modeled to capture non-uniform temperature conditions. A model for calculating the time of pressure tube failure is considered to assess the pressure tube integrity in CATHENA. Pressure tube failure is due to local necking at the top as follows [6] : · Significant temperature gradient top-to-side > 200 ºC · Prolonged local straining lasting approximately 500 s · High internal pressure above 10 MPa At high pressure scenarios, high temperature fuel channel experiments have shown that non-uniform circumferential temperature distributions lead to a pressure tube rupture.
Liquid Relief Valve and Degasser Condenser Relief Valve Model
During a total loss of all heat sinks accident, which is called a Beyond Design Basis Accident (BDBA), the LRVs are working to open as expected and the steam and water into the DCT because the electric power is available, the opening set pressure of the LRVs is 10.34MPa(a).
During BDBA, the reactor would first trip, however pressure build up in the PHTS would eventually occur due to the decay heat, which would cause the LRVs open. The DCT would be filled and the DCRV would open after the pressure reaches a set point of 10.06 MPa(g).
We considered the liquid relief valve (LRV) and degasser condenser relief valve (DCRV) model as in Figure 2 . The PHTS pressure is mainly controlled by LRVs and the degasser condenser tank (DCT). Hence, LRVs are open, and the DCT pressure increases as the LRVs discharge into the DCT. The DCT has spring-loaded safety valves, which are open to a reactor building (RB) compartment when the system pressure exceeds 10.16MPa (a). DCRVs are two 2"x3" (2"; inlet diameter, 3"; outlet diameter) proportional opening relief valves with the certified water capacity of 32.3 kg/s, respectively, but to be on the conservative side, we assumed 25 kg/s in CATHENA [7] .
Steam Generator Tube Integrity Criteria 3.2.1 Creep Rupture of Differential Pressure
Under normal operating conditions, the pressure across a PWR steam generator tube wall, Pno, is 9MPa (1,300psi); under a main steam line break (MSLB) in which the secondary side has dropped to atmospheric pressure, the pressure across the tube wall, PMSLB, is 18 MPa (2,560psi). Tubes must actually be capable of withstanding 3· Pno 27MPa (3,900psi) and 1.4· PMSLB 25MPa (3,660psi) to meet ASME Code and NRC requirements for a sufficient design margin. The margin is lower for the MSLB because it is such an unlikely event ( 10 -5 /reactor yr. is the usual estimated occurrence frequency). These maximum pressure capabilities are based on rupture or burst of flawed tubes. For typical unflawed steam generator tubes made of Alloy 600, the burst, Pb, is 65 MPa (9,400psi) [8] .
Creep Rupture of Temperature
Materials are open placed in service at elevated temperatures and exposed to static mechanical stress (e.g., turbine rotors in jet engines and steam generators that experience centrifugal stress, and high-pressure steam lines). Deformation under such circumstance is termed creep. Defined as the time-dependent and permanent deformation of materials when subjected to a constant load or stress, creep is normally an undesirable phenomenon and is often the limiting factor in the lifetime of a part. It is observed in all material types; for metals it becomes important only for temperatures greater than about 0.4 Tm (Tm = absolute melting temperature) [9, 10] .
ANALYSIS AND RESULTS

Initial Conditions for Analysis
The initiating event is a total loss of all heat sinks, causing the loss of pumps used in systems such as the PHTS, moderator cooling, shield cooling, steam generator feed water, and re-circulating cooling water. Though no active heat sinks are credited, the accident progression could be delayed due to the passive heat sinks, particularly the initial water inventories of the PHTS, moderator, steam generator secondary side, end shields and reactor vault. The steam generator ASDVs and CSDVs are assumed to fail to open. The feed and bleed system, pressurizer heater, and steam discharge valves of the pressurizer are also not credited for the analysis. For comparing both code results, the initial condition input parameters are presented in Table 2 .
Results and Discussion
The predicted timings of the transient are described in Table 3 . Because the PHTS pumps are not available due to the loss of power, the fuel heats up and the decay heat is transferred to the heavy water coolant. A temperature gradient develops between the coolant in the core and the steam generator region, which promotes natural circulation between these two regions. The decay heat is transferred to the secondary side of the steam generators, which results in a decrease in the PHTS pressure. Figure 3 flow rate out of four core paths. In addition, the remaining three paths of flow rates showed the same transient. When the feedwater pump stops, the pressure of the secondary system increases, causing the MSSS to open. As shown in Figure 4 , the secondary system coolant is released through the MSSVs.
At this point, the secondary side of the steam generators has sufficient heat sink capacity to absorb the decay heat. The heat transfer from the PHTS to the steam generators causes the water in the steam generator secondary side to boil off. As a result, the pressure in the secondary side of the steam generators gradually increases and causes the MSSVs to open and discharge steam from the secondary side to the environment outside the reactor building. The water level of the steam generators decreases as the boil off proceeds. When the water in the steam generators is depleted at approximately 5,500 secs as shown in Figure 5 , the steam generators dry out and are no longer heat sinks that can remove heat from the PHTS. As shown in Figure  6 , after about 5,500 secs nearly all the liquid has boiled off from the steam generators. So the PHT pressure rises more quickly due to the expansion of the PHTS liquid. The first opening of the LRVs is around 5,600 secs. The pressure of the primary system constantly stays for about 1,000 secs after 5,500 secs within the opening/closing setpoints of the LRVs, and the secondary system pressure stays constant after the flow of MSSVs releases at around 5.0 MPa(a). The degassing condenser pressurizes and fills with hot PHTS fluid. At this time, the pressure in the degasser condenser was high enough to cause the DCRVs (3332-RV11 and 3332-RV21) to open. The DCRVs flow increased to the maximum 25 kg/s at each valve at around 6,600 secs. At 7,500 secs, the DCRV discharge became mostly steam and the PHTS pressure increased to the maximum 14Mpa (a). At a given pressure, the valve opening for steam much less than liquid [6] . The steam relief flow is attained about 10 kg/s until after around 9,000 secs, at which time the PHTS pressure decreased to 14.5Mpa (a) as in Figure 6 . Figures 8 and 9 show the liquid and steam discharge trend of the DCRVs. After 7,500 secs, the primary system pressure decreased as a coolant of void was released through the relief valve. Figure 10 illustrates the maximum pressure tube temperature transient of the group 4 corresponding to high power channel group of each core path. In Figure 10 , the temperature of the pressure tube rapidly increased after 8,500 secs and exceeded 600 ºC. At this time, channel damaging was expected depending on the channel power and location. As a result, channel failure occurred at about 8,500 secs.
The PHTS inventory was gradually lost through the LRVs, which resulted in fuel channel dryout. The moderator heated up and the water level in the calandria vessel grad- ually decreased because the moderator cooling was assumed to be unavailable. With the loss of the moderator as a heat sink, the lead channel with the highest decay power and the smallest inventory in each loop, which had a high elevation in the calandria vessel, reached CATHENA high pressures and temperatures such that the lead channel was unable to sustain the pressures. As a result, the lead channel ruptured. With the rupture of the lead channel, the PHTS pressure dropped rapidly at approximately 9,000 secs, as shown in Figure 11 .
At this time the steam generator was filled with vapor.
The porosity of the upper part (SST1: solid line) and the lower part (SSP1: dotted line) in the steam generator is shown in Figure 12 . The porosity decreased because the turbine steam flow stopped due to the reactor trip. As secondary inventory is being decreased by opening MSSVs, the porosity kept increasing. After the MSSV opening, because the steam generator water level decreased continually, the increasing porosity of the SG upper region was faster than the SG lower region. The inside surface temperature transient of the steam generator is shown in Figure 13 . The tube temperature of SG 1 and SG 3 remained higher than the temperature of SG 2 and SG 4. This happened because SG 1 and SG 3 are connected to the liquid relief valve. The HD3 and HD7 downstream steam released through the liquid relief valves. After about 7,000 secs, the steam flow increased in SG 1 and SG 3 before the steam releasing through the liquid relief valve began in earnest. However, about 1,000 secs after pressure tube damage, high temperature steam stopped flowing into the SG tube, and the temperature stopped increasing and stayed up to 360 ºC or less.
One of the causes of SG U-tube failure is a higher temperature than 545 ºC (Wolsong NPP Unit 1 Steam Generator tube Inconel 680 melting temperature: 2,485 F (1,360 ºC), 0.4Tm=1,360x0.4=545 ºC). Another is the differential pressure between the PHT pressure and the SG secondary side pressure. The steam generator tube burst pressure with the maximum flow as estimated using ASME code, and the fitness-for-service guideline, is above 27 MPa (d) [6] .
The maximum SG tube temperature of CATHENA is below 360 ºC under a total loss of all heat sinks. The differential pressure between the primary heat transport system and the SG secondary side of CATHENA increased to 9 MPa (d) until the degassing relief valves started to release the high-pressure vapor. In our analysis results, the maximum differential pressure between the PHT pressure and the SG secondary pressure were below 9 MPa (d) as shown in Figure 14 .
CONCLUSION
In this paper, the discharge capacity of Wolsong Nuclear Power Plant Unit 1 DCRVs and the steam generator tube integrity analysis under a total loss of all heat sinks accident were analyzed using the CATHENA code. The PHTS pressure decreased as the LRVs opened. The LRVs remained open continuously. At this time, the pressure of the degasser condenser increased and caused the DCRVs to open. The DCRVs flow increased to a maximum 25 kg/s at each valve in the fluid phase. The DCRVs discharge became mostly steam and the PHTS pressure increased to a maximum of 14 MPa (a). Each DCRV flow was about 10 kg/s until 9,000 secs, at which time the PHTS pressure decreased to 12.5 MPa (a). We confirmed that the DCRVs capacity was enough to protect overpressure in the PHT system.
One of the causes of SG tube failure is a temperature higher than 545 ºC. Another is the differential pressure between the PHT pressure and the SG secondary side pressure. The steam generator tube burst pressure with the maximum flaw as estimated using the ASME code and fitness-for-service guideline is above 27 MPa (d). Under the transient, the maximum SG tube temperature was below 360 ºC and the maximum differential pressure was below 9 MPa (d). Failure of steam generator tubes is not expected since they can withstand a differential pressure of at least 27 MPa (d) based on the ASME code and fitnessfor-service guidelines. We found that the DCRVs discharge capacity is enough to protect overpressure in the PHTS, and the SG tube integrity is maintained in a total loss of all heat accident. 
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